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Abstract
Regulation of emerging issues needs new forms of gover-
nance. This new governance includes soft law approach, dia-
logues, public engagement, frames of research set by firms and
ethics in forms of codes of conduct among other things and, in
interaction with the recent dynamics of nanotechnologies, it in-
tegrates into a ‘governance landscape’. This article first sum-
marises and assesses the forms of and reasons for the turn to
governance at different issues. Then it interprets both the frame
jointly set by DuPont and EDF as well as the NanoCode recom-
mendation worked out by the EC. Reflecting on some views that
identify this recent development in the emerging regulation of
nanotechnologies as a step in direction toward innovation gov-
ernance in this field it expresses both the endorsement of this
view and some doubts that may invite to paint a bit more differ-
entiated picture of the recent dynamic.
“The regulatory challenge is” (. . . ) “to ensure that society
can benefit from novel applications of nanotechnology, whilst a
high level of protection of health, safety and the environment is
maintained.” (Commission 2008, P. 4)
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1 The turn to governance especially in the regulation
of emerging technologies
This article is a reflection on the emerging governance efforts
in the dynamic of emerging nanotechnologies. There is some
widespread turn in regulation efforts to governance in different
public policies. This is a shift from governing trials in regulation
of different issues. Government is based on ‘hard law’.1 Com-
mand and control can be appropriate when the problems and so-
lutions can be defined in advance and it is possible to design the
rules to mandate those responses. Governance is based on ‘soft
law’ and voluntary self-organisation.2 Soft laws may play com-
plementary role or may function instead of hard law as substi-
tution, both mostly as temporary solutions or fully on their own
merit. Governance approaches that mean soft law based regu-
lations get a quickly raising role in regulation of many issues,
recently. Turning to or including soft law based governance in
complementary position is widespread already in rather differ-
ent political and policy domains, not only in public policies but
for example in international politics. The different issues may
include different types of governance and may have a lot of dif-
ferent reasons. For example, soft law is a convenient option for
negotiations that might otherwise stall if legally binding com-
1 A ‘hard law’ is what we usually call a law in legal regulation. It sets
prescriptions that are to follow and orders penalty to cases when they are trans-
gressed. Both prescriptions and penalties are codified. Penalties are realised
through application of physical coercion.
2‘Soft law’ is a recently already very widely used term for all the sorts of reg-
ulation modes outside ‘hard law’. ‘Soft laws’ are of very different sorts. They
may be for example codes of conduct based on ethics. ‘Soft law’ also sets pre-
scriptions just as a ‘hard law’ and menaces with penalties too. But neither the
prescriptions nor the penalties are codified formally and its keeping unavoidably
depends on voluntary action backed by some sort of public opinion. The liter-
ature is divided if these regulation modes are rightly called ‘laws’ at all. I have
no place here to deal with this problem here. I simply use the terminology that
is dominating in issues of emerging technologies and especially of nanotech.
Inclusion of soft law has a long story already in late-modernity (coming back
in regulation actually first with international law around thirty years ago) and,
preceding formal regulation in history of mankind, actually it was ever present
in human history. Soft law is such a rule of conduct which has in principle
no legally binding force but nevertheless motivates to do something or to avoid
another thing. Several times it can serve as early model for later legal regulation.
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mitments were sought at a time when it is not convenient for
the negotiating parties to make major commitments at a certain
point in time for political or economic reasons but still wish to
negotiate something in the meantime.
The need for providing for a regulatory answer in the case of
governance of emerging nanotechnologies has mostly to do with
uncertainties that are scarcely tractable differently. The reason
is that the need to successfully manage different types of uncer-
tainties constrains to think in dilemmas to which there is not any
calculable best solution. The suggested solutions to the dilem-
mas inevitably embody and preserve some essential uncertainty.
That makes these types of regulation essentially process based.
Their main strength is that in that way they can flexibly and
quickly accommodate to quickly changing regulation situations.
There are two ‘temporal dilemmas’ that especially constrain
decision-making in the recent practice of emerging nanotech-
nologies. I indicate these dilemmas and what their tempo-
rality means. Nanotechnology (actually it is much more cor-
rect to say it in plural: nanotechnologies), a wide set of fore-
front technologies, is an unbelievable promising, so called en-
abling technology of which utilisation possibilities are believed
to be found simply everywhere. According to some global vi-
sions it even provides for the possibility of progressing system-
atic reconstruction of our surrounding world starting from the
atomic-molecular level and with this it provides technical ba-
sis for solution for most important Grand Challenges of societal
and economic types. According to very strong expectations a
nanotechnology-based biological, informatics and cognitive sci-
ence (NBIC) revolution, revolution of converging technologies,
will be in the centre of these changes.3 These expectations pro-
vide for basis for strategic technology policy making.
The envisioned future is unbelievably bright, there is a multi-
plication in the efforts to get nearer but nanotech is still in its in-
fancy. Meanwhile investment into nanotechnologies worldwide
is already over USD 10 billion4 yearly. Numerous dilemmas
emerge, including the two basic temporal dilemmas, mentioned
above. First, there is not any well-identifiable path to the market
for any nanotechnology even when some sorts of nanotechnol-
ogy especially in electronics are nearer to this status than oth-
ers.5 This situation makes supporting nanotechnology a highly
risky issue with incalculable uncertainty because you may risk
3 Find explications of what the expected converging technological develop-
ment will be in the National Nanotechnology Initiative in the USA and those
writings that try to envision what the social and economic effects may be and
what and how governing and governance efforts should be realised to further
this dynamic. Especially important is the pioneering book written by Michael
Roco and William S. Bainbridge in 2001 [13].
4 109
5 Principal researcher of MANCEF (Micro and Nanotechnology Commer-
cialisation Education Fund) roadmap, Steve Walsh reported with appealing
openness how naively, based on the presumed strong analogy to microelectron-
ics, the task of foresighting for nanotech first had been tried to be realised until
several years of concerted efforts they reached the vision of nanotech as multi-
tude of possible pathways [20].
to engage with the process to support it too early, and loose quite
a lot, or too late and will have no share from the expected extra
return.
Second, the promises of nanotechnologies are connected
on the deepest level with the strongly different behaviour of
nanoparticles in comparison to materials made from the same
sorts of composition.6 This awakes precaution concerning the
implications for environmental and health issues too as possi-
bility of adverse effects in unknown directions and magnitudes.
There are different other adversarial problems such as with the
possible abuse of some nanotech development by its utilisation
in issues of controlling. This presentation reduces its interest
to the regulation problems of environmental, health and safety
effects (EHS), and to the question, how, in this respect, gover-
nance efforts are developing in this early period already. The
reader will find pieces of information and considerations on reg-
ulation of the EHS issues in literature but, surprisingly, won’t
find reflection on a possible third ‘temporal dilemma’ in the lit-
erature. This is that quite a lot of expectations for solving so-
cietal Grand Challenges, for example meeting of problems of
ageing, are already attached to the expected quick development
of nanotech. (The challenge is that this commitment may have
been made too early.)
For ‘insiders’, those who concentrate on developing and util-
ising the potentials of the coming nanotech based revolution,
concerns about the adverse effects that are not impossible in un-
known directions and magnitudes, are ‘obstacles to innovation’
because of the hypothetical nature of fears recently. So these vi-
sions are to be somehow ignored or abolished as soon as possible
because they keep back the exploration and utilisation of the en-
visioned immense potentials. Additionally it is often said that it
will be enough to deal with adverse EHS effects when the tech-
nologies will be riper. But beside this still strong attitude there
is already emerging a different one that starts to get strong posi-
tion not only with concerned groups but with states and firms as
well. This is formulating a task of ‘getting the solution right this
time, and from the very beginning’, concerning also exploring
and meeting the alleged unknown possibilities of adverse effects
in the nanotechnology field. According to this emerging new at-
titude there is a commitment to balance the utilisation of such an
immensely promising enabling technology as nanotechnologies
are and avoid as early as possible its risks, simultaneously.
This profound attitude change may be seen as a historical
learning from some previous clashes between ‘the industry’ and
environmental and other groups as it happened with the GMO
debate. Nanotech does not have the same public mobilising ca-
6 As the Royal Commisssion of the UK states about engineered nanoparticles
(ENP): „the very properties that make ENPs attractive from a product and invest-
ment point of view may have the potential to give rise to unintended health and
safety consequences.” (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2008 p.
7.) [15] We are at the very beginning even to recognise and explore the many-
foldness of this different behaviour that is often envisioned as mostly caused by
unusual surface properties on this level of the material structure of nature.
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pacity and this thing also helps to believe that early commitment
to regulation efforts of potential adverse effects may solve the
emerging problems differently from the GMO debate. With the
new attitude, you want to avoid regulating neither ‘too early’
nor ‘too late’, just in a balanced way, in cases of uncertainties.
To ban some products or production processes too early is too
harsh, not to speak about a ban for the whole branch of industry,
while to act when the consequences are already with us is too
late, may be because some effects already are realised or because
the patternisation of the dynamic is already too much progressed
and became in some respects irreversible, meanwhile menacing
with some catastrophic consequences in the future.
There is a willingness to regulate in the appropriate time but
the uncertainty is so complicated that it is impossible to fore-
tell with some exactness, in a justified way, when the interven-
tion should be made. As it is well-known, doyen of history
of economics, Nathan Rosenberg thought that even the func-
tions and applications any emerging technology will acquire in
its historical development, the winner alternative(s), are liter-
ary unforeseeable. This way, according to his argumentation,
only blind experimentation is possible with new technologies.
More exactly, he drew the historical lesson of impossibility to
forecast what from the early forms of some technology will de-
velop later.7 Adverse effects, adverse implications would occur
in some or many or all of the various application possibilities,
most of them impossible to foretell. This multiples the difficulty
Rosenberg spoke about, because it makes a ‘double fictitious’
problem the endeavour of investigating into the possible adverse
effects of possible technologies that may be commercialised.
What about engaging in exploring the adverse effects already
in the early phases? It is only possible to say that with them it
is possible to experiment just as with the application possibil-
ities, even when this is engaging in a ‘double fictitious’ effort.
The received view is that not any new technological alternative
should be seen as menacing with quite new adversarial effects.
So search methods of the ‘similar’ issues should be utilised and
extended as trials. Mostly, in the case of nanotechnology, this
is utilising knowledge of searching for and managing adverse
effects in case of dangerous chemical substances. But surface
characteristics may cause bad surprises and there is an ethical
requirement, as driver that urges to behave differently. This is to
strongly apply the precautionary approach. This ethical driver
is the rights of those who would have been adversely effected,
without realisation of the early EHS researches in a precaution-
ary mode. But it is scarcely possible to formally prescribe what
and where should be looked for. It is better to put regulation
efforts first on the metalevel, and base on voluntary commit-
ment for a while. When patterns of the technology dynamic
will already somehow be developed and solidified, when the dy-
namic is already in its normal phase, than formal legal regula-
tion is much more possible already and can be realised than in
7Rosenberg (2001, p. 8.)[14]
the phase of emergence when too many unknowns hinder for-
mal regulation. This article presents some pieces of information
about the historical state of the voluntary engagement and makes
some speculations about its future.
May some sort of systematic (searching) behaviour develop in
the phase of emergence of new technologies and may be made
partly responsible for the dynamic emerging technologies will
take or is this phase unavoidably to left to random experimen-
tation as Rosenberg suggests? As we may recognize in rudi-
mentary forms in some emerging recent practice and may learn
from complexity studies, self-organization as reflexive practice
shows the way to solution to this problem.8 There is in prin-
ciple possibility of some ways of modulation of evolution both
in respect of the envisioned purposes and to avoid the possible
adverse effects as far as possible.
2 Some historical learning
What about some already available historical learning con-
cerning possible EHS effects of new technologies? In nut-
shell we can say: repeated clashes around environmental issues
among industrial firms and environmental movements were re-
alised in a ‘two tracks’ dynamic at least from the 60s in the 20th
century. (Two tracks dynamic means that firms and environ-
mental groups simply realised oppositional relation, simply mu-
tual distrust in the dynamic.) A turn to a discursive dynamic of
‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ to develop the process into a sustained
dialogue was made from the early 80s, first especially in The
Netherlands and Denmark. Embodiment of this was the appear-
ance of the constructive technology assessment approach (CTA),
the inclusion of the citizens, local communities into technology
assessment in The Netherlands and similar approaches in Den-
mark, later in the UK or Germany.
It is important to mention that regulation of the behaviour of
industry (and research institutions) in presence of the certain and
uncertain adversary environmental, health effects was tried in
this historical period, from the end of the 60s, by the states by
extending the existing administrative regulation to handle tech-
nological risks. First institutionalisations in this approach led to
the foundation of the Office of Technology Assessement (OTA)
and the Environmental Agency (EPA) in the USA in 1972. Real-
isation of formal regulation required quantitative knowledge of
risk as measure of uncertainty, the quantitative risk assessment
(QRA).9 The very basic assumption concerning knowledge of
uncertainty started from the presumption that uncertainties are
nothing but not uncovered risks, calculable in the situations to
regulate and this provides for sufficient factual knowledge base
to regulation. QRA calculations realised by experts and explo-
ration of the ‘subjective’ risk perceptions of the adversary agents
or the public in general in the uncertainty arena together pro-
8 Ralph D. Stacey’s Complex responsive processes in organizations is a
uniquely important guide in many respects to this issue [16] .
9QRA has steadily been improving, for example by introducing fuzzy set
technique and extending considerations to more uncertain situations.
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vided for knowledge base for risk management and government,
for the normalisation of uncertainty based on calculation of risk.
Four main problems grew out with this approach.
• The first is its lack of discursivity with the different publics,
the rigid top-down regulation.10 (As in other issues in moder-
nity simply experts were legitimised to investigate into the
problematic situations of non-experts and tell them the needed
solution.) This was a strong factor for citizen groups, local
communities often experienced that they are interested in dif-
ferent sorts of risks then the experts who provided the risk
knowledge for the public administrations.11
• The second is that the multiplicity of uncertainty in decision
making was tried to be reduced to quantitative risk assessment
problems.
• The third is that the multiplicity of quantitative risks sur-
rounding some issue was often only partially, from one or
another aspect, taken into account and this way, contin-
gent choices in methodology permeated the calculations with
strong policy and political effects, unacceptable for the ef-
fected local communities.
• The fourth is that it was not seen that emerging issues are
not enough patterned to be able to simply submit them to
calculation. As shortage of this historical period one can
say that values, aspects of uncertainty were chosen without
justification discourse by all the stakeholders, including the
different publics. Especially ignorance aspects of the uncer-
tain situations were neglected and with some reminiscence
to well-calculable situations it was also expected that simply
calculations can provide for the sufficient factual knowledge
ground for managing/governing the EHS risks in the emer-
gence phase of new technologies.
All these aspects have had their role in the ongoing and sustained
clashes, in the continuing and several times even amplifying
public distrust in several technologies. Effects of massive irra-
tionality by wide masses accompanied in numerous cases these
processes. But in this period of history acceptance of new tech-
nologies even enthusiasm for many of them dominated in the
public even when it got paired with enduring rejection of some
others, especially of utilising GM techniques for the agriculture,
by different publics. This led to some dead end like situations in
several public policy issues around different emerging technolo-
gies. As some learning, the wish repeatedly has emerged that
some turn in regulation should be realised. This turn would be a
more cooperative approach. That, as far as possible, would take,
first, adequately, into account all aspects of uncertainty. This
includes temporary ignorance elements with possible adversary
10 The sometimes occuring instrumental utilisation of ’lay factual knowledge’
or ’local knowledge’ to spare time when making expertise is an exception of less
importance in this respect.
11 This is not to confuse with the much emphasised ‘subjective’ perceptions
of quantitative risks.
effects, when the decisions should be made. The possible devel-
opment of regulation of the dynamics of emerging technologies
could lead this way to some sort of social robustness around
these dynamics in co-evolution with the functions, applications
of the emerging technologies. Second, this, non-reductionist be-
haviour would be realised in an anticipative mode. In this co-
evolutionary process some social robustness is realised. This is
the width of support by the different social groups for emerg-
ing technologies would essentially contribute that utilisation of
the promises of new technologies can be realised while simul-
taneously regulating the (possible) dangers. Actually, the idea
that emerged was about the co-evolutionary interactions of vari-
ation producers (in terms of technology) and the publics as com-
parative selectors. This process includes of course possibilities
of enduring refusals notwithstanding any effort in cooperative
learning.12
By now, we witness the emergence of a wide ranging pol-
icy innovation in this direction. This is exemplified in the turn
to self-organizational governance through the discursive coop-
eration, dialogic relation of all the stakeholders (including con-
cerned groups) around the emerging (nano)technologies. This
emerging governance integrates de facto coordination dynamic
and normative efforts. Kearnes and Rip emphasises the com-
plexity of this issue and term it as a ‘governance landscape’.
De facto coordination and normative efforts together provide for
some ‘governance landscape’ [9].As to its overall function some
stability and continuity in action even in uncertain situations are
needed and the emerging landscape provides for it by unifying
the factual and the principal with some duration.
A de facto coordination dynamic may involve a huge set of
ingredients, probably in different architectures, that accommo-
dates to the individuality of the situations. A de facto coordi-
nation dynamic may include both institutions and cognitive and
organisational tools and may be realised as some open method
of coordination (OMC). Explicit forms of coordination may in-
clude strategic visions, roadmaps, technology platforms, lead
market initiatives (LMI). But communication forms, like con-
ferences, articles in journals also provide for some implicit, in-
formal coordination. The normative efforts may include setting
all those explicit forms already mentioned but also codes of con-
12Enduring refusal may remain latent as it was with ’the rise of the dictature’
when in the Korean Republic the dictatorial government ordered to sow those
seeds around 40 years ago that were, benevolently, developed for the Korean
folk by US agrar experts who reduced their problem to tasks fully defined in
agricultural chemistry. Unfortunately it did not taste the Koreans and they forgot
about it with the fall of the dictature. It was different with Valencia where the
issue became irreversible when the dictature solved the problem of extraordinary
flood by simply diverting the river, through digging an artificial channel, from
the city. As enduring partial accomodation, by the population of Valencia, to the
realised (practical) irreversibility includes that already the house of the Opera
is in the old left river bad. Co-evolutionary inclusion as any instrument has its
weaknesses too, but at least would not be able to delegate the responsibility for
bad decisions with hard consequences. (The stories are from the PhD lectures
of Imre Hronszky [8].)
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duct by firms or states or set together by the agents in the arena.
They may include labelling schemes, principles, guidelines, rec-
ommendations set by the EU or for example by the OECD for
Multinational Enterprises (MNE), model codes, certifications,
standards such as the recently under preparation Social respon-
sibility ISO 26000. There is interaction between de facto coor-
dination and normative efforts, based on some consensus among
the stakeholders that explicitly intend to realise modulating ac-
tions in the evolutionary dynamic. The result of this cooperative
effort would be getting, in some sense, ‘better technologies’.
Among other governance instruments numerous frames and
codes of conduct for nanotechnology appeared in the last some
years, actually from 2000. These include the frame jointly ac-
cepted by DuPont and Environmental Defense Found (EDF)
(Dupont Nano Partnership 2007) in the USA in 2007, the code
of conduct developed by the BASF in 2004 and also the code
of conduct developed by the European Commission by 2008.
They all are partly different things but are elements of the ex-
perimentation with governance, by way of setting frames and
codes of conduct. This amplifying experimentation with devel-
oping a new governance landscape, in relation to the possible
adverse effects, is recently a most important emerging achieve-
ment for the governance of emerging nanotechnologies. But it
can be expected that it will be serving as the model for any other
governance of emerging technology issues too.
As mentioned the new governance instruments that together
realise a bottom-up regulation mode may provide either for a
complementary effort or a substitution for regulation based on
formal laws, for the top-down regulation. Actually, with emerg-
ing issues they work in a complementary way with the old regu-
lation but instead of the coming new, until, through progressing
patternisation (standardisations are decisive part of it) it does not
become possible to include more formal regulation. Whether
and when in the more stabilised phase more formal legal reg-
ulation that became possible will also be realised depends on
different issues. It depends for example on the comparison of
mutual strengths and weaknesses of formal and informal regu-
lation. These are also different for every agent in the arena that
raises the complexity of the regulatory situation. This is a re-
lation that is strongly dependent on economic, political social
and ideological contexts. Assessing needs for and possibilities
of formal regulation (just as it is with soft law based regulation)
needs serious SWOT analysis for any special case. Just as a brief
hint to some weaknesses of regulation based on formal law we
find among the numerous situations that may be practically un-
able to be regulated in some special environment by formal law
those environments in which some rapid breakthrough political,
technological, economic or social changes occur. Drivers in this
direction may come from inside too, so to say, as (unexpected)
emergence of radical innovations in the field as well as together.
3 Advantages of, difficulties with governance ap-
proaches
Trials to realise formal regulation may fall short in the emer-
gence phase when the numerous uncertainties surrounding radi-
cal innovation in this phase simply make impossible, or at least
senseless, to set governing laws. Beside this we find as basic
weakness with hard law based regulation that it constraints the
actors in the arena instead of trying to provide for an enabling
milieu where co-operative actions of the stakeholders may even
lead to enormous synergic effects. That means that above the
uncertainty problem considerations, some urge to shift to an en-
abling milieu may give impetus for raising and maintaining gov-
ernance and soft law based regulation.
The question arises how to normalise this emerging phase, is
it possible to somehow normalise it at all?13 (Concerning look-
ing for the range of application alternatives it may not be desir-
able at all but this is different with normalising the relation to
possible adverse effects.) Instead of accepting that the choice is
simply ‘yes’ or ‘no’, to preliminary indicate the direction I try to
justify, a term will be introduced, the ‘soft normalisation’ to help
follow the issue.14 (Its meaning will be made clear through the
whole article.) ‘Soft normalisation’ is by its nature something
partial, unbalanced in some way, temporary in the regulatory dy-
namic but has already some, tentative direction with promising
of the cooling of the dynamic. But it is already some progress-
ing patternisation15 and at least recently trials are made in it to
modulate it toward some solidified structure of the dynamic to
be able to exploit it. But it is a legitimate question if the acceler-
ation of technological development and the raising turbulence of
the socio-economic environment will systematically move ‘soft
normalisation’ toward giving place to enduring normalisation.
We find in the wide regulatory practice already that turning
to soft law regulation may provide for some sort of good solu-
tion for governance of emerging issues. While a soft law itself
lacks the possibility for legal sanctions it still has effects in legal
practice, for example its principles may serve as starting points
13A positive answer to this is explicit denial of the idea of Rosenberg that
we are essentially condemned to blind experimentation for a while in the most
important respects.
14 I overtake the term from Imre Hronszky, from his PhD lectures. (Hron-
szky 2006 [8]). We can model emergence of new technologies as progressive
emergence and solidification of trends. An aspect of this may be, usually it is,
that different sorts of ‘soft law’ will be accepted by the agents to provide for
normative regulation. These together with the de facto governance processes
are the governance landscape. They provide for some sort of normalisation of
these processes of emergence that progresses from quasi rule-less original state
to emerging patterns. This means that dominating ways of handling the prob-
lems of emergence appear and get some solidification, both on the factual level
as research methodologies and the normative level to regulate what would be ac-
ceptable. Soft normalisation is giving dominance to a governance landscape, the
progressive self-organization in regulation of, to say it with Thomas S. Kuhn,
some preparadigmatic phase. In his paradigm dynamic model, well described
exemplars and formal prescriptions take over the dominance in the normal sci-
ence (normal technology) phase [10].
15 This may be realised in a dynamic of repeated circles.
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for renewed legal regulation. But soft law itself is not enforced
and realised by any state or other administrative apparatus, it is
based on voluntary action. Instead formal enforcement capac-
ity, it rests upon the voluntarily agreed discursive cooperation of
multiple authorities and sharing and deciding on mutual com-
mitments. Mutual commitments are the base for it. Soft law
regulation can serve for benchmarking, influencing the issues at
stake or providing for some sort of informal controlling.
A new governance landscape with the emerging nanotechnol-
ogy is quickly emerging now. A lot of questions have been rais-
ing with this development in the last decades. I mentioned some
of them. They included the questions of what actually are the
purposes of turning to governance?, further the more instrumen-
tal question: What are the effective means of its enforcement?
From the perspective of methodology of cognition we can won-
der as follows. Because in this phase, any standardisation effort
would certainly need strong caution even when it may be our
explicit aim to reach standardisation with the progress in the dy-
namic we can only say that the individuality of the situation can
only be diminished by utilising some analogies to provide for
some sort of ‘inductive’ generalisation.
But we can try to characterise the turn to governance from
a different perspective and may recognise that we turn to gover-
nance instead of more efforts of governing either because we are
not able to prescribe some constraint or because, for some rea-
son, we are not willing to do this. In this later case we may want
to leave independence for utilising the continuing flushing state
of the issues to be able to develop some further joint effort based
on the preserved free initiative of some agents. But weakness in
power may be the reason too, to turn only to soft regulation as
well as basic uncertainty. This and many other reasons may have
an effect together that we would not turn to standardisation as
soon as possible. Instead we only agree on voluntary codes for a
while even when we are not sure how long. Voluntary codes fre-
quently rely to a considerable extent on such uncertain issues as
the market (e.g. consumers, shareholders, insurance companies)
or public administration issues, peer and community pressures
to stimulate and sustain policy outcomes, and make extensive
use of non-governmental intermediaries (e.g., industry associa-
tions, consumer and environmental groups, and standards orga-
nizations) in code development and implementation.
In contrast to a widespread but superficial opinion gover-
nance and soft law based regulation is not without possibility
of any penalty. In lack of the possibility of formally constrained
penalty still there are numerous other possibilities of penalty, or
rewarding. I just mention some of them. They are based on the
various non-judicial forms of power in society. If you belong
to some association it can withdraw its logo from you, a nega-
tive publicity can be developed around your firm, you may be
excluded from the important association, all the different sorts
of penalties and rewards for non-compliance may be effective.
You may further be simply excluded from information flow too
or loose other essential networking capacities. The formal law
is either fully helpless when watching informal regulation in a
concerned way. Perceiving resistance to soft regulation may in-
duce turning to, even trigger some regulation based on formal
law. It can be judged if for example reasonable standard of care
is applied with the soft regulation but some agents still resist
to it, or whether you really joined the self-regulation in ‘good
faith’, etc.
It is interesting, on the philosophical level first, if turning to
governance efforts is due to the sheer complexity of the issue
and it just realises an instrumental behaviour or it is part of the
shift toward a more deliberative, participative democracy or is a
trying to realise both.16 For example Habermas and his follow-
ers envision a coming free, emancipated society in which gover-
nance and soft regulation will be dominant and formal law pre-
serves some subordinated role. As Gunther Teubner describes:
“The task of the law then is still to control power abuses, but the
central problem becomes rather to design institutional mecha-
nisms that mutually increase the power of members and leader-
ship in private institutions” (taken from [21]).
Because our case is the dynamic of emerging issues, espe-
cially of technologies, it is unavoidable to emphasize that there
is no central agent in this case that has that comprehensive
knowledge in comparison to any other agent in the field that
allows to realise an, in principle optimum allocative regulatory
behaviour. With this we have just to recognise the invalidity,
for emerging issues, of one of the very basic innovation pol-
icy assumptions of the neoclassical economics. Instead we find
capacities that may be developed and put into action by the prin-
cipally uncertain agents. This is realising free co-operation and
self-regulatory, or co-regulatory behaviour. Innovation policy
gets a different role in the changed situation. It is, first of all,
setting preconditions for evolution and realise vigilance. This is
then to unify with some early selective activity but preserving
space for flexible changes with this during the dynamic.
All this may lead to quick adaptation to the turbulent issues
as it is so often emphasised, but the quickness is only one side.
It seems at least as important that the self-regulatory dynamic
together with the mentioned role for policy/management actions
is realisation of a reflexive activity that includes what Michael
Foucault calls ‘responsibilisation’. Only ‘responsibilised’ quick
actions help really to reach sustainable pathways. It is also de-
cisive that governance may lead to sharing uncertain risks or,
as Imre Hronszky emphasizes in the PhD lectures, may lead to
sharing knowledge and trust (!) and exploring and exploiting
with all this a still not well known economic resource, the coop-
eration extended to global dimensions.17 It is still rather ques-
16 In this respect is possible to understand that extremely narrow types of
interpretations of the recently raising governance regulations that they are ei-
ther realised for sparing the perceived transaction costs or just the opposite they
realise some philantropy and nothing else are quite misleading because they
concentrate only on one, perhaps only alleged element.
17 Technology determinists falsly attribute this unbeliavable growing cooper-
ativity to the Internet as its effect on society.
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tionable how and certainly strongly dependent both on agents
and environments, the different requirements, sharing uncertain
risks (looking for safety), and sharing innovative knowledge
(looking for entrepreneurial possibilities) may be integrated in
good solutions. The historical practical learning in this direc-
tion led to good practices from clustering and network building
to the forms of recent ecosystems practice and analysis. In a
great part this is the effort of developing appropriate evolution-
ary behaviour in turbulent dynamics to reach sustainability.
All these aspects I only indicated can be and are already
deeply analysed. I go in some details. Concerning risk taking
Kernaghan Webb reflects on more detailed issues and asks why
those parties that engage in voluntary co-ordinations undertake
the risk. “In resorting to using voluntary codes, it is apparent
that all parties are taking risks. Businesses that initiate code ini-
tiatives may find their efforts criticized as failing to accurately
and fully reflect the interests of those affected, as not being rig-
orous or transparent enough, and as being nothing more than
thinly disguised public relations exercises designed to win new
customers or discourage the introduction of new laws. Non-
governmental organizations that initiate voluntary codes may be
attacked for their bias and unrepresentativity (and hence the il-
legitimacy and non-credibility of their initiatives), as engaging
in get-rich-quick schemes to fill depleted coffers, and as lacking
the experience and business acumen to run the programs. Gov-
ernments run the risk of criticism that they are abdicating their
regulatory responsibilities, are engaging in favouritism when
program formulation and implementation are not scrupulously
open, accessible and fair, and (when initiatives fail) of backing
the wrong horse.”
By giving answers to these questions she continues as fol-
lows: “If the risks are self-evident, then why do all three sets
of players continue to develop the codes? The most obvious
explanation is that they all variously feel compelled to initiate
the programs. Individual firms and industry associations may
develop the programs to ‘answer their critics’ (be they govern-
ments, non-governmental organizations, the media, community
members, or others) or to ‘get ahead of the curve’ (by antic-
ipating and addressing problems before solutions are imposed
on them) and thereby maintain or increase profitability. Non-
governmental organizations may initiate voluntary programs to
‘get things done directly’ (out of frustration with perceived inac-
tion or inadequate action from government or industry) or to ex-
ploit an opportunity to influence action through the market and
thereby gain revenue and influence. Governments may resort to
voluntary programs to reinforce regulatory programs, because
regulatory approaches are ineffective, cumbersome, slow, ex-
pensive, inefficient or inappropriate, because resistance to new
regulatory programs is too great, or to stimulate action that
goes ‘beyond compliance. She concludes: ”In all cases, the
proponents have apparently concluded that the command-and-
control regulatory model is not enough, and that it is necessary
to develop non-command-and-control initiatives”[21]. (Empha-
sis made by her.)
It is possible to state perhaps that self-regulation aims at sus-
tainable dynamic through sustainable governance. With the dy-
namics of emerging issues, of emerging technologies, etc. the
need for self-regulation and its very basis in soft law is the
requirement upgraded because of the lack of stable structures.
Self-regulatory efforts contribute to the process of developing
stable patternisation. The dynamic of the issue at stake, tech-
nology or anything else in its emerging phase will be modulated
and reflexivity gets essential role in this process.
Two things at least are still to mention. First, there is some-
thing to say about the recent move to proceduralisation that is
everywhere emphasized and discusses in political science liter-
ature. That means in our respect that mostly procedural rules
for dialogue building are to be set as candidates for consensus,
much less the substantial (value) side. The story is then about
trying to realise some successful boundary working that the
agents commit themselves to harmonise their behaviour along
the shared values, by keeping rules of proceduralisation, or try
to move in a justifiable way to a different type of proceduralisa-
tion and value sharing.
In cases like the governance of the dynamics of emerging
technologies proceduralisation seems both unavoidable and very
useful too. We can identify both with the dynamics of emerging
technologies empirically. The case of governance of emerging
technologies is about impossibility of predictions and there are
numerous parties in the arena with different substantial (value)
attitudes. Self-regulation of the conflicts and turn them to co-
operation essentially needs a procedural attitude. To say with
Habermas this is “providing a framework within which an ex-
panding diversity of conflicts can be regularized through pro-
cedures that open up the possibility of ‘dialogue’ between par-
ticipants” (taken from Webb 2004, p. 385 [21]). Second, it is
demonstrated that governance may work well in economic fields
with strong consumer presence. What about emerging technolo-
gies, where markets are still missing or at least uncertain? Who
are the players on the, let me say for shortness, consumer side?
One problem with emerging issues is that you can expect sur-
prises, actually on both sides that quite unexpected candidates
of producers and consumers appear and wish to get engaged
with the discourse. The emerging technology may take an unex-
pected turn and offer with this new exploitation possibilities or
the sensitivity of the consumers may suddenly change, for exam-
ple because the technology (its production process or product,
or the services it offers) enters into some new contextualisation
process. Declaring and practising corporate social responsibili-
ties is a promising soft law regulation form that may have strong
influence on the process when a technology stabilises in its eco-
nomic, social, political milieu.18
18Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is „business decision-making linked
to ethical values, compliance with legal instruments, and respect for people,
communities and the environment.” (www.bsr.org) I would be inclined to ex-
plicity include into this characterisation the determination to sustain and rein-
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Finally, I want just to mention a highly technical explanation
why self-regulation becomes so important for regulating nan-
otech. Robert Lee and P.D. Jose write: “Given the divergence
and uncertainties in the assessment of risks and benefits associ-
ated with nanotechnology, regulatory oversight in the future is
likely to be partial and fragmented. Even where interests con-
verge, the large time-frame needed for standardization of regu-
lation coupled with the varying propensities of countries of the
world to understand, assimilate and respond to risk issues in-
crease the difficulties associated with creating appropriate regu-
latory regimes. In the absence of such controls, it may be nec-
essary to rely on corporations behaving in a socially responsible
manner by self-regulating when dealing with the conceptualiza-
tion, development, use and disposal of nanoparticles. Caught
between the reality and rhetoric, corporate managers need to
manage trade-offs between corporate advantage and social re-
sponsibility in ways that may have a significant bearing on the
survival of their firms and the future development of nanotech-
nology itself” [11].
4 On the emerging governance landscape in nanotech-
nology
Kearnes and Rip (2009) [9] quite recently summarise what
the emerging regulatory landscape is and what sort of success is
with it already realised, what it does promise and what are its
limits. Assessment of this topic may be made from very differ-
ent angles. Their interest to assess the emerging regulatory land-
scape is whether and how public participation will be strength-
ened in the recent dynamic. Their starting point is that a starting
turn from risk governance to an innovation of governance has
been occurring. This means that not only the governance of risk
but the whole innovation process including its purposes too is
more and more topic of reflection by different publics, together
with a growing requirement for participatory processes in the
upstream phase already.19
Result of this is an ‘emerging governance landscape’ of nan-
otechnology. With this an overcoming is emerging of the two
extremes in regulatory intentions. One of the extremes is sim-
ply requiring mandatory moratorium as it was done by the ETC
group or the Green-Peace UK in 2003. The other extreme is the
force dialogic relation to affected publics and aspiration to shifting to more and
more to self-regulation.
19 Different forms of the very quickly developing so called open innovation
radically shift the relation among producers and consumers. Firms recognis-
ing the new resource for reaching comparative advantage already systematically
count with comsumers as designers too. This side of the story may help a lot
not only to accept but also willingly integrate concerned groups too. It may
work as some sort of assisting mechanism. I shall come back in more detail
to the suggestion that systematic integration of concerned groups in dynamics
of technological development is envisioned as some further possible even de-
cisive resource both as possible comparative advantage on the market and for
democratisation of the development of new technologies when I deal with the so
called TEKSS report that was made on request of the DG research of the EC in
2006.
identification of the challenge, in terms of EHS issues, set by the
emerging nanotechnologies, by downplaying it as if ‘business
as usual’ could probably be adequate answer to it, perhaps with
some smaller corrections.20 Kearnes and Rip enumerate several
state institutions that share this opinion, expectation. They also
show that with the emerging recognition of the possible depth
of the uncertainty problem and its regulation possibilities a turn
to soft regulation is emerging. They summarise the reasons why
this turn occurs. They also outline some possibilities that an ap-
propriate governance landscape may open with enhanced public
participation.
Kearnes and Rip characterise the nano issue with four uncer-
tainties. They are as follows. The first is what they call the
‘time dilemma’. This is that we may be too restrictive with lim-
iting development possibilities of certain nanotech directions too
early or just may be too late with interventions concerning ad-
verse EHS effects.21 The second dilemma what they identify is
the typical dilemma economists and managers concentrate on.
This is that you may be too late to take place on the bandwagon
to harvest the returns or you invest into the enterprise too early.
The third dilemma is how the publics will behave, even in
face of the above mentioned changes. It is their important merit
that they put this dilemma into their enumeration and may be
at least somewhat surprising for the readers. The reason for
the surprise may be that the turn to developing responsibility
frames and codes is certainly made in the hope by the agents
who unified to do some undertaking, especially by the produc-
ers, but perhaps also by the state agents, that concerned publics,
and their own conscience, will be enduring satisfied with this
progress. This is an important point and I shall come back to
it when the question of how to go further, the possible visions
of the possible future after the setting and introduction of eth-
ical codes and the whole recent governance landscape will be
touched on. They add a fourth dilemma to the series of dilem-
mas they set. This is how the state authorities will react on the
further development and what sort of hard regulations, cristalli-
sation of legal regulations will be made in the future based on
the moral that will be able to drawn from the starting dynamic
of soft regulation trials.
Kearnes and Rip share the opinion of Roco when enumerate
strengths of turning to soft regulation. They emphasise that this
type of regulation is of enabling nature. But I think they as-
sess three characteristics of the emerging new regulation mode
as most important. The first is that it is the turn as a whole
itself as quite deep change in ‘philosophy’ of solving contro-
versial issues, the turn to a sustained dialogue and giving to it
a minimum regulation, acceptable to every agent who commits
to interact in the arena. The willingness to realise some coop-
eration of a group of ‘adversary’ agents have stabilised, at least
20 In case of nanotechnology the wondering still is alive if simply some exten-
sion of the regulation of the safety for chemical substances could be the solution.
21 I think they are wrong with the naming because the second dilemma they
mention is also ‘time dilemma’.
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as a temporary solution, to channel the dynamic of the interac-
tion of firms and environmental groups to a dialogic form, by
now. Second, Kearnes and Rip also emphasize that this type of
governance is of anticipatory nature and willingness to pursue
opportunities and risks on a gradual basis will make innovations
based on new technologies possible and to meet early the pos-
sible adverse effects, simultaneously. The third characteristic is
that the recently starting form of governance provides, at least
in some measure, as I shall come back to it somewhat later, only
a part of the solution of the old problem of the relation of the
movemental form of governance versus administrative regula-
tion. This is as follows. Provided the progress of cooperation
will be able to be continued long enough, the situation may be
cooled down enough so that an appropriate administrative regu-
lation phase can follow the recent more ‘movemental’ phase.
I know Kearnes and Rip are determined in supporting the
recent development, but this is only a part of their full opin-
ion. With the alleged achieved progress in the role of public
participation by environmental groups the claimed positioning
that is expressed by the need to turn to innovation governance is
still perhaps only half way realised. But they envision a grow-
ing requirement of a symmetric relation between the concerned
groups and firms in a further changing dynamic toward realising
a “general culture of responsibility” as the EU code of conduct
requires (EU Recommendation 2008 p. 7 [6]). Taken everything
together they conclude that a balancing effort is realised that as
some sort of ‘calculative approach’ takes into account both the
support for furthering nanotechnology and providing for its safe
realisation.
5 What can be the next phase?
I indicated several times that Kearnes and Rip identify the
recent turn as a most important progress in the regulation story
of nanotech. DuPont and Environmental Defense (EDM) realise
together, just as the EC some pioneering steps.22 But they also
give hints in their paper that they imagine and expect a further
historical period thereof. (I referred to their hints at the end of
the last paragraph.) To help understand what their evaluative
position is that allows them to expect and obliges to require a
further historical period of governance I have to make a longer
overview to show what some relevant basic tenets of critical STS
are concerning this issue.
This summary has to be started from a very short philosoph-
ical consideration.23 To any sort of question of practice we can
approach from two starting points. Somebody may look first
for learning what sorts of facts are available to help understand
what the situation is, he is or may be involved and interested
to change. This means that she turns to science to learn about
22 How far all these efforts are only pioneering steps is to see if one looks at
the very small number of firms that have engaged in the process of setting a soft
law based governance dynamic of nanotech already.
23 I follow with this the argumentation made in the PhD lectures of Imre
Hronszky [8].
the facts, believing in the capacity of science as independent au-
tonomous institution to provide the management/policymaking
practice by the needed valid factual knowledge. As result she
gets a picture that shows the factual limits to the freedom of the
management/policymaking action. She gets the ‘risk profile’ of
the issue at hand in our case. On this basis she can weigh what
can be planned based on her values, the subjective side. This is
the traditional way of planning and leads, in the simple (abstract)
case, to well-known series of steps. These are first the descrip-
tion/prediction step, followed by planning by involving values
to make the plan. In case of stability, of well prognostisable dy-
namic and validity of some other simplifying preconditions an
iterative process of repeated cycles of predicting, planning and
controlling can be realised. This type of preparing the manage-
ment/policy making action is called ‘facts first’ or ‘sound sci-
ence based’ approach. I soon demonstrate what the problems of
critical STS with this approach are.
Environmentalist or health groups for example typically ap-
proach the question of practice from the other end. ‘Values first’
is their starting point, the commitment to values they intend to
realise. In case of uncertainty the two approaches led to very dif-
ferent dynamics and results. Let me begin with something that
may be a bit take aback. Here we may meet a special sort of dog-
matism by concerned groups. Because there is arguably some
sort of unknown danger to guess in the story of emerging tech-
nologies they face they may realise a concerned behaviour, per-
haps as even requiring (at least temporary) banning, even when
otherwise purposes of developing the new technologies would
highly fit their values. (Concerned people that give dominant
place to their feeling may simply base their dogmatic behaviour
on their feelings, only.)
But there is some ethical rationality behind this behaviour.
The ethical rationality behind this behaviour that is dogmatic as
a whole and in terms of some epistemic criticism is that you
want to avoid some adversary effect without a compromise. In
case of some new products this may refer to not accepting some
consequences of committing a second order statistical failure.
This is that you may err on the one or the other side, a type of
winner-looser situation in solving the uncertain situation is set.
Erring on the ‘consumer side’ will provide damages on them.
These damages are not ethically justifiable because the benefits
fall on the other side. But all this together means that a cor-
rect ethical standpoint may lead to false, dogmatic behaviour in
practice if it is not connected to a valid cognitive argumentation.
How to overcome dogmatism? It is to connect the ‘values
first’ commitment with valid cognitive argumentation and real-
ising participation in a dialogic communication and practice. I
think the, a quarter of century long development of the argumen-
tation around the precautionary approach and the precautionary
principle provides for some solution. But to be able to under-
stand this we first have to make a differentiation between two
interpretations of precaution. Common in both of them is the
basic structure of precaution. A precautionary approach has to
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realise a high level of safety, of protection as some value com-
mitment, in the presence of strong uncertainty, but presence of
plausibility concerning the facts. According to the first type of
interpretation the decision maker simply accepts what is pro-
vided for as factual knowledge (by experts) and makes decision
about the application or non-application of the precautionary ap-
proach. You evaluate if the uncertainty of facts makes the situa-
tion to manage already too dangerous for your chosen protection
level.
The precautionary approach, application of the precaution-
ary principle belongs this way already to the institutionalised
tools of management/policy making by for example the Euro-
pean Union and reflects on the factual knowledge experts pro-
vide for. It realises a ‘science guided management’ process
(CEC 2000). This is the typical way to interpret the precaution-
ary approach. We find it with the group of risk experts who in-
terpreted the precautionary approach when UNESCO asked for
an expert material (UNESCO 2005). For us now that message is
first interesting that you are justified to use the precautionary ap-
proach because your values allow you this decision. (COMEST
2007) You may differentiate between weak and strong variants
of the precautionary principle as it is done in practice according
to the difference whether you prescribe ‘it is possible’ or ‘must’
in the prescription of application. From our recent point of view
this is irrelevant, even when the practical consequences of using
the ‘weak’ or the ‘strong’ version are enormously different. The
precautionary approach is a management principle this way.
But a group of STS researchers, of the constructivist sort of
Science and Technology Studies (STS) researchers,24 declares
the precautionary approach as first being not a management but
a risk assessment approach. They identify what we can call a
decisionist fallacy when traditional risk science defines its risk
topic and methodology25 they put their finger into the, at the
end not fully avoidable, contingency of providing for facts and
demonstrate that facts just as risk facts are unavoidably con-
structed.26 They demonstrate that different sorts of objective
description may be provided for the same situation, depending
on different perspectives. This means that some sort of norma-
tive commitment is realised by any chosen perspective.27
24 Science and technology studies is a well instutionalised research approach
that tries to search science (or technology) without disciplinary abstraction at the
very beginning. It takes science (or technology) as object of study in interaction
with its environmnet and resorts to the different disciplinary tools as the process
of research requires. Its main advantage is its holistic starting point. ’Construc-
tivist’ means in this respect that the ’basic epistemic bias’ is that any solidified
form of scince (or technology) includes results of decisions at the ’boundary’
work. That ’boundary work’ means how the object is defined, what its essential
characteristics are, etc.
25 I assess some decision a decisionistic fallacy when contingent elements are
included into some methodology without reflecting on it.
26 TEKSS (Felt – Wynne 2007) [7] enumerates a long list of contingent
choices, starting with characterising risks with mortality instead of other pos-
sibilities, etc.
27 Paradoxically, to realise that objective description of the factual world that
is relevant to the policy issue, the researcher has, unconsciously or consciously
STS researchers require that the looking for facts will be the
most possible careful not only in terms of providing for tech-
niques to realise the highest possible exactness, but first includ-
ing most careful weighing of all the possible perspectives and
dimensions to choose for the frame of looking for facts. This
means that the highest possible precaution should be realised
already in risk assessment, in looking for those risk facts that
are representative from the practical point of view they have to
serve for. One has to find the adequate risk (uncertainty) de-
scription.28 The essence of what traditional risk science requires
when it puts its requirement to be ‘objective’, that means to be
the least biased, is most reached when not only the reproducibil-
ity is provided for but this precautionary approach on the assess-
ment level is as fully as possible realised.29 Nota bene (!), this
is not any critique on risk science and expertise as a whole but
requiring a more reflexive risk science and expertise.
Further, in contrast to the mainstream of risk assessors critical
STS insists on the equal importance of all the different sorts of
uncertainty and tries to put adequate emphasis on ‘ignorance’,
too. In this respect, the precautionary approach is a management
approach, a management approach that gives due attention not
only to ‘ignorance’ but also to reflexivity. That last requirement
gets its special importance when ‘indeterminacy’ occurs and you
have to try to get orientation at all. To add to this is that this
group of researchers identifies that in real issues there are always
different classes of risks/uncertainties present and present not
simply as different categories, but they interact, interpenetrate
each other in real life cases. The table below helps to make
understood the different sorts/qualities of uncertainties.
I have now to indicate at least what critical in the critical
STS behaviour means. This is some sort of political commit-
ment to uncover what the consequences in the practice, polit-
ical and policy consequences can be if one and not the other
sort of risk/uncertainty description will be realised and chosen
as factual basis for decision making.30 The conclusion is that
to take some value perspective to frame its methodology or she makes it just by
chance as many risk researchers do, when for example just analogically utilise
some standardised framing.
28 As a study prepared by the Institute of Prospective Technology Studies
(IPTS) prettily formulated: applying precaution is not using less science as the
defenders of the precautionary approach are several times accused, and as some
falsely really do, but using more science by trying to diminish decisionism by
including all the possible research perspectives as far as possible [17] .
29 Satisfaction with simple reproducibility of some, eventually identified risk
relations does not try to overcome the contingency and decisionism just because
it does not even try to make topic of research all the possibilities how much
reproducible risk quantities are possible to be found around the same research
object.
30 The most simple technical decision can exemplify this. Take the problem
of characterising the risk of an accident. There are a lot of different possibili-
ties. It is possible to measure it, say, by the ratio of human death in an accident,
or additionally taking into account injuries, material damages, etc. It would be
even possible to take into account non-material damages, giving special way if
the dmaged person is a child, etc. But in the case it is decided for one characteri-
sation that also means that not any other alternative is chosen as being represen-
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Source: Kearnes and Rip 2009 32
Fig. 1. Coordination, soft (and hard) governance
Tab. 1. Different qualities of uncertainty
• Risk: under which we know both the probabilities of possible harmful
events, and their associated kinds and levels of damage. This is where
the various techniques of risk assessment are most usefully applicable.
• Uncertainty: where we know the types and scales of possible harms,
but not their probabilities. This is the best established ‘strict’ definition of
the term ‘uncertainty’, under which ‘risk assessment’ is strictly not appli-
cable.
• Ambiguity: where the problem at hand is not one of the likelihood
of different forms of harm, but where the measurement, characterisation
aggregation or meanings of the different issues are themselves unclear,
disagreed among specialists or contested in wider society. For example:
how exactly do we define ‘harm’ or ‘risk’?
• Ignorance: where we don’t have complete knowledge over all the pos-
sible forms of harm themselves. Where we ‘don’t know what we don’t
know’ – facing the possibility of surprise. This renders problematic even
the questions that we ask at the outset in risk assessment.
• Indeterminacy: where the possibilities for different social ‘framings’
depend ‘reflexively’ on complex interactions and path dependencies in
the co-evolution of social, technological and natural systems. In other
words, not only do our commitments and choices depend on what we
know, but what we know is conditioned by our preferred or expected com-
mitments and choices.
Source: Felt – Wynne 2007, [7] p. 36
the first political/policy step is made already when the type of
risk/uncertainty description is chosen. Responsible discourse, a
dialogue of equal partners as the very first step over the framing
of the looking for risk/uncertainty facts, framing of the method-
ology in the wide sense is to realise to avoid the mentioned
decisionism as far as possible. 31 This is the point where the
tative for the risky/uncertain issue. It is easy to see that the chosen methodology
for identifying ’the facts’ has policy and political consequences.
31 ‘Nature’, the world outside, its characteristics that are unknown when the
need for being the most possible circumspective may meet the
need for democratisation of expertise. If one accepts that public
participation may provide for additional perspectives that realis-
ing the requirement for the most possible responsible approach
to uncover risks/uncertainties of some situation makes coincide
the instrumental and the political requirements: a full participa-
tion of stakeholders including the effected publics becomes the
highest requirement. This is not about substituting the experts
at all but engaging with them in the framing of their work in a
dialogue, in a ‘two ways communication’. This puts strong re-
quirement on both sides. It requires experts to acquire an expert-
citizen quality and the publics as much understanding of exper-
tise that enables them to reflect on the framing of the expertise.
I put a graphical overview of the dynamic of co-evolution of
society and new technology, according critical STS.
Kearnes and Rip (2009) [9] certainly interpret this way the re-
cently strengthening dynamic of dialogue, and the steps already
made in some direction, represented by the NanoRisk Frame-
work and the recommendations the Code of Conduct set by the
EC formulates and this makes up an essential part of their cri-
tique. But this is only the upside down part of the innovation
dynamic, the dealing with the safety of some innovation driven
for whatever reason. But they go further and assess the steps
already made in practice by these efforts from a more requiring
point of view too.
This is actually the turn from risk governance to innovation
governance that the publics and concerned groups should get a
dialogic relation to the very goals of the innovation dynamic.
This is realising a participative democracy that provides a fur-
responsible reflection on framing is made have their essential role. So, even the
most responsible approaches are always limited and require from time to time
renewing reframing efforts.
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ther resource for innovation dynamics. There is a uniquely con-
centrated formulation of this perspective in an expert report, ac-
tually a manifesto, Taking European Knowledge Society Seri-
ously (Felt – Wynne 2007 [7]) that was prepared for the DG
Research of the EC in 2006. From this ambitious point of view
there is a new global innovation challenge. This is to change the
whole frame in which the global innovation efforts are made.
While the recently dominating frame requires the as soon as
possible exploration of for new resource for their exploitation
as soon as possible in the global innovation race the alternative
their suggest concentrates on the direction. It would give pri-
macy to responsibility and will realise it by systematic inclusion
of concerned groups into a dynamic of systematic experimenta-
tion to ward a more sustainable global society. From this point
of view the frame set for research on uncertainty by DuPont
and US Environmental Defense (EDF), the “Nanorisk Frame-
work to Aid in Responsible Development of Nanotechnology”
and the Code of conduct worked out by the EC are first steps in
this direction.
We can ask how far may this be projecting wishes into some-
thing? How far setting the framework is more result of con-
straints than of estimated benefits for DuPont, or any other com-
pany? On what pressures were the Nano Risk Framework devel-
oped by DuPont and Environmental Defense Found (EDF) and
the Code of Conduct worked out by the EC? More general we
can ask the same about the recent proliferation of similar issues,
especially of voluntary codes. How far are these efforts if not
some sort of greenwashing but only promises first for commu-
nication and marketing reasons?
One possible answer may be that firms try to meet the per-
ceived challenge that some governments or governmental de-
partments for example in the UK are more and more willing
to listen to the ‘hidden anxiety’. Having had earlier clashes in
bad memory regulatory institutions start to consider anticipa-
tive regulation measures. Nanoscience and nanotechnology are
a special issue in this respect, for a number of reasons. First,
because they do not exclude some very concerned interpretation
around the implications in terms of adverse environmental and
health issues.
32ELSA in the table is for Environmental, Legal, Social Impacts Analysis.
Prescribing ELSA investigations was first introduced in the USA in the early
90s.
6 Some doubts
33 Second, because nanotech, in comparison to the GMO is-
sue has much smaller mobilising capacity among the citizens.
So, a possible clash can be prevented. Third, and this is also a
lesson from the earlier debates, any sudden catastrophe would
cause incalculable public reaction effects. Fifth, governments
and public administration institutions, self-governments may get
inclined, even determined to meet the still ‘hidden anxiety’ an-
ticipatively.34 Taking into account the (partly by firms antici-
pated) pressure by the governmental side may be a strong driver
for companies to engage in some sort of voluntary action.
Beside that can you count with some comparative advan-
tages in the market when demonstrating anticipative responsi-
bility that means not only responsibility for the recent produc-
tion processes and products but also for the possible new ones.
But the main problem I think with the recent Nano Risk Frame-
work is that it does not refer to any sort of ‘soft punishment’
in case firms would not behave according to the quite thorough
guidance.
The Nano Risk Framework requires to iteratively realise a
process of six elements in developing a rational basis for fu-
ture regulation. The code operates to both produce baseline data
and to demonstrate best-practice within DuPont. As such the
framework has six steps for both the development of informa-
tion of the use of nanomaterials, and commissioning of forms of
life-cycle analysis and risk management. The six steps, which
operate sequentially through the lifecycle and risk assessment
processes, include:
33 Simply, the uncertainty is rather high, in many cases with nanoparticles,
even when reports from different research institutions and frommany firms often
have a ‘business as usual, only with a bit more care’ style. It is typical that these
sorts of reports mostly have a quite contradictory effect in the public than that
they intend to reach. This is the case, say, when a report produces data on effects
on ‘the skin’ simply, without any differentiation, or suggests that nanoparticles
should be handled the same way as quartz particles, because both are possible
causes of lung cancer and the management technique suggested is putting the
waste in paper bags and signalise that hazardous nanoparticles are in the bag.
34 As an example I refer to the EU Parliament critique over the perceived
insufficient development of responsible nanotech in April 2009. ”Parliament
calls for the provision of information to consumers on the use of nanomaterials
in consumer products: all ingredients present in the form of nanomaterials in
substances, mixtures or articles should be clearly indicated in the labelling of the
product (e.g. in the list of ingredients, the name of such ingredients should be
followed by the word ‘nano’ in brackets). MEPs deplore the absence of a proper
evaluation of the de facto application of the general provisions of Community
law in the light of the actual nature of nanomaterials.” The information is taken
from an EU portal (Public health 2009).
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Step 1: Describe material and application
Step 2: Profile Lifecycle(s)
Step 3: Evaluate Risks
Step 4: Assess Risk Management
Step 5: Decide, Document Act
Step 6 Review and Adapt (DuPont Nano Partnership
2007, 8).
Kearnes and Rip correctly observe that “the Nano Risk
Framework is similar to the voluntary schemes developed by
Defra in the UK and the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), inasmuch as it relies on developing baseline data upon
which to commission life-cycle analyses and further risk as-
sessment and risk management activities.” (Manuscript to the
DEPEN meeting in Budapest, 2009, p. 18) They correctly em-
phasise: “However the framework goes further”(. . . )”in that it
requires action on the basis of the information developed. As
quoted above, it is through this ‘information-led’ process that
the authors of the framework suggest that ‘the adoption of this
Framework. . . support[s] the development of a practical model
for reasonable government policy on nanotechnology safety.’
(DuPont Nano Partnership 2007, 7) In this way the BASF and
EDF/DuPont codes operate strategically and in an anticipatory
way, in order to guarantee each firm a stake in future regulatory
debates, and indeed to frame future debates on the regulation
of nanotechnology through the compiling of relevant informa-
tion and the demonstration of best practice.” (Manuscript to the
DEPEN meeting in Budapest, 2009, p. 18)
The evaluation of risks is conceptualised as an ‘information
led’ approach in the Nano Risk Framework. Three critical re-
marks seem to be correct in this respect. First, and this critique
is positive, that in contrast to this it tries to give place to precau-
tion in the meaning of precautionary assessment too through ap-
plication of worst case scenarios in case of ‘information gaps’.
The second critical remark is that the Nano Risk Framework
too much emphasises the continuity with established risk assess-
ment procedures. So, it states: “Although we began this partner-
ship without any preconceived opinions on whether nanoscale
materials might require entirely new methods for evaluating and
managing risks, we were pleased to find that the basic princi-
ples of many existing risk frameworks could be applied to our
work. For example, this Framework follows a traditional risk-
assessment paradigm similar to the one used by the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) for evaluating new chemi-
cals” (DuPont Nano Partnership 2007, p. 16). Third, the whole
planned process is narrowly expert based at least in its concrete
texts. It speaks for example about the importance of dealing
with potential triggers for obtaining additional data, but does
not suggest to do this in interaction with possible users, workers
(DuPont Nano Parnership 2007, p. 24). So the frame is result of
cooperation with environmental NGOs too, and especially with
EDM, but it does not suggest concrete participation of NGO-s
in realisation of the concrete search processes.
I want to tell some remarks on the Code of Conduct recom-
mended by the EC. Conceptualising the works the principles
layed down in the Code the Commission declares them as in-
tegral part of institutional quality insurance mechanisms. Based
on the aim to develop a general culture of responsibility needs
and desires of all stakeholders should be taken into account to
reach good governance of N&N research, with emphasis on the
“challenges and opportunities that may be raised in the future
and that we cannot at present foresee.” (EU Recommendation
2008, P. 7) The Code of Conduct realises a position of requiring
anticipatory governance based on utilising the precautionary
approach. Unfortunately the precautionary approach is iden-
tified by it as management principle, only.
I finish this short overview with the observation that with the
recently already reached governance elements some firms and
some concerned groups constructed already a jointly shared
boundary object. As any boundary object this too allows that
while preserving their basic differences the agents can work on
topics of joint interest. It depends not only on the willingness
of the participants but unforseeable interactions in the rather
turbulent milieu of the recent world history how quick and wide
the consolidation of the working around the common boundary
object of coevolutionary governance will be reached.
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